Collective memory studies generally focus on national commemorations of heroes and heroic events that unify nations. Recent research also examines the contribution of negative collective memories that vilify individuals and organizations, and collective memories that remain in contention. This study examines the contending collective memories that surround the protest cycle of the late 1960s to early 1970s Japan through analysis of three key events: the First Haneda Incident of 8 October 1967; the climactic battle between Zenkyōtō students and riot police on the Tokyo University campus 17-18 January 1969; and the Asama Sansō siege and Rengō Sekigun purge of early 1972. A heavily negative view of the entire period has solidified in public collective memory through commemorative media presentations and films that recycle visual images of the protests into a blur of senseless violence without explanation of its causes. This overwhelmingly negative collective memory reinforces the dominant values of social order while suppressing the underlying issues that sparked the protests. Those who experienced the period as student participants also view the outcomes as negative, but they keep alive more positive memories of their youthful participation in protest events and the issues that motivated them, through nostalgic commemorations and media that circulate within a New Left subculture.
Introduction
This study concerns contentious events and how different collective memories and meanings have been constructed about them. The contention arises between participants in the Japanese New Left versus others in Japanese society who experienced the events primarily through mass media representations that in turn reflect state interests to a considerable extent. It follows the line of research that views collective memories as necessarily contested and having a strong political dimension (Fine 2001; Kansteiner 2002; Popular Memory Group 1998; Zerubavel 1996) . Much collective memory research focuses on social outcomes, and investigates how public commemorations of historical events and collective memories of national heroes contribute to the integration of society by reinforcing moral values. A second concern takes a more constructivist approach to investigate the social processes through which collective memories are constructed. In Difficult Reputations, Fine (2001) argues that the study of negative reputations of people or organizations can also contribute to these two central questions. He identifies three types of difficult reputations: negative reputations that have become solidified, contested reputations that remain unsettled, and reputations that are solidified differently by conflicting subcultural groups.
Although collective memory studies often focus on public commemorative ceremonies about major events in national history, the focus here is on fairly recent historical events that are commemorated through print publications and mass media products such as live television broadcasts of events, constructed media clips that are broadcast on the anniversaries of the events, and both documentaries and dramatic films based on the events. These media form the basis for public collective memories of recent events (Dayan and Katz 1992) , starting with live broadcasts with high viewer audiences. Then through the recycling and rearrangement of visual images from the footage they construct a public collective memory that carries certain meanings, and other cultural products extend and reinforce these meanings. The events are also remembered more personally by those who participated in them and have published their own accounts, often in print media that are circulated through counterculture bookstores and through other smaller scale commemorations and gatherings. Focusing on three seminal events that marked the beginning, peak, and collapse of the violent New Left protest cycle of the late 1960s and early 1970s allows us to examine the connections between the events, both prospectively and retrospectively, within the competing strands of collective memories. That in turn will help to place the case study findings within the broader field of collective memory studies.
The New Left protest cycle of the late 1960s and early 1970s was a period of political, ideological, and physical conflict in Japan, on a level that seems almost unimaginable four decades later. It deeply marked the generation that came of age as students during that period, and has produced polarized, contending collective memories in contemporary Japan. This study examines the nostalgia, memory, and myth making surrounding three seminal moments of political violence in the protest cycle. The first is the violent protest in the area of Haneda Airport on 10 October 1967, in which a Kyoto University student was killed, which galvanized students to engage in protest, gave rise to myth making about the student's death, and remains central to contemporary memories of youthful protest. The second event is the battle at Yasuda Auditorium on the University of Tokyo campus in January 1969, the defining moment of the Zenkyōtō movement, which created a new style and rationale for campus protest, produced the literary genre of "Zenkyōtō Bungaku," and is a continuing focus of nostalgia. The third event was the 1972 Rengō Sekigun incident, encompassing the siege at Asama Sansō and the internal purge that preceded it but only subsequently came to light. This event is widely viewed as the death blow of the New Left protest movement, but lives into the present with a flow of books, films, and documentaries forty years later.
The continuing flow of commemorations and new cultural products about these events stirs up old emotions and reinforces conflicting collective memories of the whole period of protest. There is a dominant collective memory presented to the general public through mass media, and there is a set of counter-memories that are circulated through Japan's invisible civil society, a loose network of individuals, groups, institutions, and communications media main-Patricia G. Steinhoff tained by and for people who participated in the Japanese New Left during the protest cycle of the late 1960s and early 1970s. They moved on with their lives after the state cracked down on violent protest and the public movement declined, but have continued to have a higher level of involvement in civil society and protest activities (Kage 2013; Kurita 1993) . This loose network is generally invisible to the broader public, but its participants maintain a lively public sphere through which they continue low-key, legal social activism and keep alive collective memories of the events of their youth.
The analysis is based on a wide range of Japanese sources including mass media and movement newspaper accounts of the events; primary and secondary accounts by participants, journalists, academics, and other commentators; observations from my interviews of participants; and novels, films, and TV dramatizations that have shaped the public understanding of the events. I do not have access to the original television news broadcasts of the three events, although I have viewed much of the NHK footage of the Asama Sansō siege that is part of the Rengō Sekigun Incident. There are references to the TV coverage in many accounts and in two recent academic studies, and there are many still photos of the same events. In addition, film clips of the events often appear in the documentaries and films that constitute part of their collective representations. I have found relatively little commemoration of these events on the Internet. I analyze the three events in the context of my broader research interests in the New Left, particularly the Red Army groups that were among its most violent elements and whose members participated in all three events. After briefly presenting some essential background on the Japanese New Left, the article summarizes the basic findings about differing understandings of each of the three events in turn, and then considers how they are connected in competing collective memories. The conclusions attempt to place the findings into the broader issues of collective memory research.
Background and context of the Japanese New Left
Japan's "long decade" of New Left protest began with the emergence of the New Left in the late 1950s, out of a factional split in the Japan Communist Party-dominated national student movement organization (Zengakuren) that had operated on most college campuses since the late 1940s. From its inception the Japanese New Left was separate from and opposed to the Japan Communist Party and developed its own independent Marxist policies. The New Left partici-pated prominently in the 1960 Ampo protests as the mainstream faction of Zengakuren, using confrontational tactics that produced direct clashes with the police (Steinhoff 2012) . Although only about half of Japanese homes had television in 1960, these were the first protests to be widely covered on television and to be experienced essentially in real time by the general public (Chun 2007; Packard 1966) . In a massive protest demonstration around the Diet on 15 June 1960, a female Tokyo University student named Kamba Michiko was trampled to death and instantly became a martyr to the New Left. Over the next several years the New Left declined as various segments debated the cause of their failure to stop the treaty and split over the best way forward (Takazawa and Takagi 1981) .
The New Left emerged from the 1960 Ampo protests with a deep sense of failure, alienated from national electoral politics and internally divided, but with the infrastructure to mobilize students nationally and a continuing commitment to the confrontational tactics that had become the hallmark of their protest style. By the mid-1960s the major national New Left organizations began rebuilding their campus base in preparation for protests against the 1970 renewal of the US-Japan Joint Security Treaty, or 1970 Ampo. They planned once again to coordinate their student protests with the opposition parties, labor organizations, and civil society organizations. However, by then both the organizations and the issues had become more complex and fragmented. The revision of the security treaty itself was a more complex issue that came to focus on the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control, but it was also tied to opposition to Japan's indirect involvement in the Vietnam War, conflicts over US military bases in Japan, and nuclear armaments on US naval ships making Japanese port calls.
By this time Japan was also in its period of high growth, which brought both new prosperity and industrial pollution, along with rising demand for college-educated youth to fill the expanding ranks of the New Middle Class (Vogel 1963) . Postwar educational reforms had greatly increased the percentage of high school graduates and raised their aspirations for college education. Entry into existing elite universities became increasingly competitive, while private institutions proliferated and expanded to take up the slack. This constellation of forces produced both a vastly larger student population that could be mobilized for protest and an array of issues to fuel student discontent over campus conditions (Steinhoff 2012) . In addition, already by 1963 three-quarters of Japanese households had television, and NHK (the national broadcasting station) had become the dominant source of television news, putting coverage of large-scale protests into living rooms throughout Japan (Chun 2007; Krauss 2000) .
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These factors set the stage for the New Left protest cycle of the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the escalation of violence that marked its student protests. The Japanese New Left organizations that engaged in violent protest had developed a distinctive style and tactical repertoire, as had the Japanese riot police who responded to their actions. Both sides were nationally organized and centrally controlled institutions, which increased the predictability of their behavior. Japanese New Left protests typically escalated in violence within a single protest event when an innovation by either the students or the police breached the limits of the expected repertoire. These escalations reset the boundaries for subsequent protest events. The three events examined here involved sudden, major escalations of violence that had broad impact on the movement and the public. All three were front page news in the national daily newspapers and were heavily covered in television news broadcasts.
3 First Haneda Incident (10/8 or juppachi )
What happened in the event
One central issue in the Japanese protest cycle of the late 1960s and early 1970s was Japan's peripheral involvement in the Vietnam War, through the Japan-US Joint Security Treaty. The impending 1970 date for revision and renewal of that treaty was a focal point of the protest cycle, and the reversion of Okinawa was the key issue in the treaty negotiations. Okinawa was under US occupation and packed with US bases from which bombers could fly directly to Vietnam. The Japanese Left had long opposed the treaty itself, but the Vietnam War seriously exacerbated the issue and drew a wider public into the debate. When the government announced that Prime Minister Sato would leave on a trip to Southeast Asia including South Vietnam on 8 October 1967, protests were organized against the trip with an eye toward mobilizing for the broader campaign of opposition to the 1970 security treaty renewal.
The major Left parties and their affiliated union federations announced their opposition to the South Vietnam visit, and the Asahi Shimbun editorialized against it as well. The much more radical New Left student organizations wanted to prevent the Prime Minister from leaving, so 4,000 riot police were deployed to seal off all the roads leading into the airport to prevent them from getting anywhere near it. Haneda Airport is built on a land-fill island in Tokyo Bay, separated from the mainland by the Ebitori River. In 1967, in addition to a monorail, it was accessed by Expressway #1 (the route the Prime Minister was to use) and by three road bridges: the large Anamori Bridge, the much smaller Inari Bridge beside it, and the Benten Bridge a few blocks farther down the river. At 6 a.m. on October 8, the riot police had sealed off all these entrances. Initially, the riot police blocked the bridges on the airport side, but after an unexpected contingent of students arrived early at Inari Bridge and nearly crashed through into the airport, the police moved their lines to the bridge entrances on the mainland side and reinforced them with their large, gray buses and armored vans serving as barricades.
Activist students had come to Tokyo by bus and train from all over the country, and had spent the night of October 7 holding rallies and staying overnight at several college campuses in Tokyo. At one campus there was a squabble among New Left groups participating in a federation called Sampa Zengakuren, 1 in which the two sides threatened each other with poles and lengths of lumber, as was customary by then in internal factional disputes. The dispute did not quite come to blows, but as a result of this conflict, some members of both Chūkaku and the rest of the Sampa federation went to the protest wearing construction helmets and armed with long fighting poles or lengths of raw lumber, which had previously been used only for internal conflicts and not for fighting with the riot police. Also gathered for the protests were about 1,000 young workers from small, non-union shops who had been organized and mobilized by the students into a Socialist Party-sponsored anti-war organization (Hansen Seinen Iinkai) that participated regularly as a component of the New Left.
What followed was a day of escalating violence that played out on the expressway and on all three bridges leading to the airport and the road running alongside the river across from the airport. Different groups of student protesters confronted the riot police at each location. While the conflicts continued on all three bridges with crowds of bystanders watching from the riverbank, the Prime Minister's car arrived safely at the airport and his plane left quietly from a different gate. By this time several police vehicles were burning, the bridges were littered with stones, and high-powered police water cannon trucks had hosed many students off the bridges and into the river. Demonstrators zigzagging beside the river were chased by the police into nearby alleys, but finally straggled off to tend to their wounded. The Chūkaku group continued to fight on Benten Bridge, defending their perches on top of the big police vans despite being blasted by the water cannon trucks.
At one point they pursued the riot police on the bridge so aggressively that the police retreated to the airport side of the bridge, abandoning some of their vehicles in the middle of the bridge. The students commandeered a police van and used it as a battering ram to push around a water cannon truck that had also been abandoned on the bridge. Using the loudspeaker and microphone in the vehicle to urge students to follow them, they drove the vehicle toward the airport, with students running alongside and the riot police attacking them fiercely, when suddenly a shout went up that a student had been killed. The fighting stopped. The police quickly whisked the body of Kyoto University student Yamazaki Hiroaki off to a hospital by ambulance and cleared the Benten Bridge.
Word of the death quickly reached other groups that had already left the scene. They marched back to Benten Bridge to protest the student's death, which they regarded as an assassination by the police. They were holding an impromptu rally with speeches in the middle of the bridge when the police suddenly announced that they were going to fire tear gas in two minutes and urged bystanders to leave. The use of teargas was quite a sensitive issue in Japan at the time, and this was its first use since the 1960 security treaty protests seven years earlier. Once the teargas was fired, the rally crumpled. Police attacked with batons and water hoses, sweeping students off the bridge and into the river. Eventually the remaining students left the area. Rallies were held that evening on several university campuses to protest the riot police, who were blamed both for the student's death and for their violence against the protesters.
Hundreds of students and police were injured in the day's fighting, and 58 students were arrested. In the aftermath of the event the Cabinet threatened to raise the stakes for protest by invoking the Anti-Subversive Activities Law against key New Left groups. Undeterred, all of the New Left organizations incorporated the experience of the First Haneda Incident into their framing of subsequent protest activity as well as their tactics. 2 The police charged the student who had been driving the police vehicle with having run over him, while others continued to believe the student had been killed by police blows. Regardless of how he had actually died, the New Left protest movement now had a new martyr who had died for the cause, to be memorialized just as 3.2 Analysis of the event at the time I was first intrigued by the First Haneda Incident when I noticed that New Left student activists almost invariably invoked this event as a critical turning point in their own involvement. Social movement studies have repeatedly demonstrated that participation in a protest event serves to reinforce commitment. However, this was not just the response of those who actually participated in the First Haneda Incident, which is often referred to as juppachi -shorthand for the date of 8 October 1967. Students who had not been involved, who may have been apolitical at the time, report that when they learned about the incident and the death of a student, they felt that now they had to join the fight in his place. While one might think that escalation of the stakes of protest to life threatening would be a deterrent to joining the movement, for many it became a call to action. Understanding why requires digging deeper into the dynamics of the event and how it was perceived by observers. By 1967 the great majority of Japanese homes had television sets, and because it involved the Prime Minister's international trip, the event and the protests were heavily covered on the evening news. Film clips showed the fierce battles between the students and riot police on the bridges through a haze of spray from the water cannons and later teargas, but observers could draw their own interpretations of what they saw on the screen.
Lacking access to the TV news coverage, I did an intensive content analysis of the newspaper coverage of this incident in both the major national newspapers and several newspapers published by the New Left student organizations that participated, which had fairly wide circulation among students (Steinhoff 2002) . The protest was the lead story in every newspaper. In the Asahi it was the only substantial story on the front page, accompanied by a photograph of students falling off the bridge into the river (see Figure 1) . The other two daily newspapers also carried smaller front page stories about the arrival of the Prime Minister in Jakarta on the first leg of his trip. It was the primary story in all of the organizational newspapers. Each account reflects the partial view of those who collected the information or observed it directly. 3 Very detailed coding was done for Asahi and four student newspapers using Event Sequence Analysis (ESA) to examine the internal processes of escalation of violence. The accounts of participating groups as reported in their organizational newspapers offer a front-row seat at the action sequence within a protest event, in sufficient detail to analyze the process of escalation as an interaction between protesters and police that comprises both physical actions and symbolic gestures. Ironically, the student accounts also tell us much more about police discipline and student provocations than Asahi, which simply reported police actions to control the students and not the interaction that preceded them.
3 The mass media had routine access to the information provided by police to reporters assigned to the police beat reporters' club, but they also sent reporters to the scene of the protest. However, those reporters could not observe everything in this complex multi-site event, so the coverage is quite uneven and sometimes scrambled or incomplete. The student accounts are very detailed for the parts of the action in which their members participated, but sketchier for what other groups were doing, especially if they were in a different location.
In four sequences protesters tried to gain access to space defended by riot police, which involved fairly aggressive provocations by the students and escalation on both sides. The students began with a massed frontal attack on the police lines that sometimes succeeded and let some students through. The police then responded with a baton attack to push them back behind the barrier. The police reacted to stone-throwing attacks by holding up huge nets behind which a police unit could move forward and back, but they also rushed forward to attack the students with their batons, causing injuries particularly to protesters without helmets. It is clear from the newspaper pictures that some students were using lumber and fighting poles to counter police baton attacks on the two main bridges, which was a significant escalation of violence over previous protest events.
As the students found ways to penetrate the police barriers and get onto the bridges, the police escalated to the use of water cannon trucks, whose highpowered hoses knocked students down, sweeping them off the tops of police vehicles and off the bridges into the water. The water hoses were applied with deliberate force against individual targets, much as one might use a stream of water from a garden hose to force slugs off a deck. The students also delighted in symbolic gestures to crown their short-lived victories over the police, such as clambering on police vans and flying their flags. Although the police were well disciplined and acted under clear orders from their superiors, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that their escalations were motivated as much by the students' symbolic affront to their honor and authority as by the physical threat they might pose by breaking into the airport grounds.
Two other sequences within the First Haneda Incident do not fit this pattern of direct student provocation producing an escalation by the police, but instead constituted a sudden escalation of police violence against relatively nonviolent protest activity. 4 These relatively unprovoked escalations of violence late in the 4 Both occurred after the Prime Minister had left the airport, when the weary police wanted to clear out the protesters once and for all. Near the Anamori Bridge, after it was apparent the Prime Minister had left, the antiwar labor group ended a peaceful sit-in on the road and began an apparently nonviolent zigzag demonstration in which others quickly joined. However, some riot police units had moved into position behind them, and set upon the bareheaded protesters with a violent baton attack, chasing those who escaped down nearby streets and beating anyone they caught. The second such incident came at the very end of the day, when over 2,000 protesters from the various groups had gathered for an impromptu demonstration on Benten Bridge to protest the student's death. The protesters were crowded onto the bridge listening to impassioned speeches by their leaders when the police suddenly announced that they were going to use teargas and urged the bystanders to leave quickly. The tightly packed demonstrators on the bridge did not move and police tear-gassed them and day reinforced the demonstrators' sense of victimization. In sum, even though one might argue that the First Haneda Incident was violent from the beginning, a close look reveals systematic sequences in which violence escalated through interaction between protesters and police. This was the first protest event in which students engaged in sustained battles with the police, as opposed to hitand-run gestures of defiance.
There is a related dynamic to these interactions that appears repeatedly in student accounts of police behavior in the First Haneda Incident: "They ran away." Confronted with unexpected aggressive action by the students, police units sometimes retreated, leaving the surprised students with an opening of some sort, plus a temporary sense of power. 5 In every case of an apparent retreat, the police quickly re-grouped and returned to attack with an escalation of violence. The police retreats appeared to give the students an exaggerated sense of their power to defeat the police as symbols of state power, while the subsequent police escalations surprised the students by their violence and led to feelings of victimization.
The battles on the airport bridges were played out in full view of the press and thousands of bystanders who watched from the riverbanks. The students perceived these bystanders as "the masses" who supported them, and their actions took on additional symbolic value because of their awareness of that audience. Non-participants who read only the Asahi newspaper reports would not have seen the riot police retreating in the face of the heavy barrage of stones thrown by students, though they would have seen news photos of students with helmets and poles lying on top of police vehicles. However, viewers who watched the fighting on television did observe such retreats. In addition to scenes of close combat between similarly armed police and students, they also saw students being forced off bridges and into the river by the force of police water cannons, and police chasing and beating bareheaded students with nightsticks. Hence the television coverage, along with news of the student's death, aroused considerable public sympathy for students at a time when there was also quite broad public opposition to the government policies then attacked with batons and high-powered hoses that eventually flushed them off the bridge. 5 In three of the four escalation sequences there was a clear retreat by the riot police: they retreated on the expressway ramp, which allowed the students to run down the roadway; police who were caught in front of their vans in the first frontal attack at Anamori Bridge were reported to be "crushed" and they ran back onto the bridge to escape "in full view of the bystanders on the riverbank" as the organization newspapers report. Finally, a police retreat under a relentless stone-throwing attack left police vehicles abandoned on Benten Bridge for the students to commandeer as weapons, which resulted in the student's death. and actions that the students were protesting. In a careful analysis of news coverage following the event, Marotti (2009) has found that overall the newspaper coverage roundly condemned the violence and quoted the state's official position while dismissing the students' aims, which student leaders responded to vigorously in their own media. Following the "Second Haneda Incident" a month later, the major newspapers began to temper their views and pay more attention to the broader context of the violence.
Subsequent memories and impact
The First Haneda Incident has taken on iconic status within the New Left as the point when everything changed and the movement took off. It is referred to in virtually every autobiographical account by a New Left activist that I have ever read. The event had just as great an impact on students who were not there. Some just note that when they heard a student had died they felt they had to become active themselves in his place. Konishi Takahiro, who was an apolitical University of Tokyo medical student at the time, recollects that when he saw the incident on the television news and saw the police retreating he suddenly realized that the state was not invulnerable, and that with sufficient force the students might actually win over the riot police, whom he viewed as the symbol of the power of the state. Wakabayashi Moriaki, a student at Doshisha University, remembers that the atmosphere on the campus suddenly changed. There was a feeling that something was beginning, and everyone got interested in political debate and began reading about political ideas and issues (Tamiya et al. 1990 ). 6 Wakō Haruo, who was a rōnin student attending an exam preparation school in Sendai, remembers the First Haneda Incident and the street violence against the student protesters as part of his "baptism" into the student movement when he entered Keio University the following spring (Wakō 2010) .
The Incident also appears in several works of fiction written by persons who participated in or were close to the student movements of the time. 7 Some of these depictions reinforce the perception that "something was starting" and "everything changed" with this incident (Kitakata 1984; Taki 1979 ), but at least one includes a character who turned away from activism because of the high risk he perceived after the student's death (Taki 1979) . Even characters that dove into the movement through participation in the First Haneda Incident looked back on it with great ambivalence because of what happened subsequently. The protagonist in Kitakata Kenzō's novel describes a violent animal part of his nature that was unleashed when he participated in the First Haneda Incident and fought for the first time with helmet and fighting pole. These memories come back when he becomes violent again in totally non-political circumstances years later, and he reflects that when he participated in that first violent demonstration he never dreamed that the movement would degenerate into internal fighting within the movement (Kitakata 1984) .
One particularly interesting reflection was Takahashi Kazumi's novel Tasogare no hashi, which was left unfinished when he died in 1971 and published posthumously (Takahashi 1971) . The story concerns a jaded veteran of the earlier (presumably 1960 Ampo) protests who happens to observe a student protester being beaten by a policeman during a protest on a bridge, and then dying after he is pushed into the river. When the police subsequently report that fellow students were responsible for his death and try to prosecute them for it, the protagonist gets involved in the case and begins to turn his own life around. Although the author took major liberties in recasting the incident in Kyoto rather than Tokyo, the novel is widely understood as obliquely referring to the First Haneda Incident. This fictional account's point of view is noteworthy: a former activist from an earlier generation feels a sense of responsibility to get involved when he sees younger student protesters being victimized by the police.
Despite its broad impact on students and these later literary representations informed by student protest experience, the First Haneda Incident is really not remembered in the general public's later recollections of the period. It happened at the very beginning of the late 1960s protest cycle, and was the starting point of an escalation of violence that the public came to experience later on, through massive demonstrations on Tokyo streets over the next three years. It is typical for a social movement that only those close to the movement remember its beginnings, and the public memories start with later events. Yet the First 7 See below for further discussion of these novels in the context of the 1969 University of Tokyo conflict and Zenkyōtō literature.
Haneda Incident clearly had a major impact on how the movement subsequently developed, since the innovations of that event became institutionalized in the tactical repertoires of both the protesters and the police. The escalation of violence in this event was anticipated and replicated in subsequent major protests, becoming the platform upon which new tactical innovations developed.
Yasuda Auditorium, Zenkyōtō, and the University of Tokyo Conflict
Although there were scattered incidents and student strikes at university campuses earlier in the mid-1960s, a wave of extended campus strikes and building occupations engulfed Japan from 1968 to 1970, involving a total of nearly 170 campuses. This wave was part of the larger New Left protest cycle of the late 1960s to early 1970s, but it had distinctive features for two reasons: it involved local campus issues rather than larger domestic and international issues; and it gave rise to a new pattern of organization, called an all-campus struggle committee or Zenkyōtō, which is quite different from the New Left "sects" that claimed to inherit the mantle of the original Zengakuren. Campuses were already organized by competing student groups representing the various New Left sects and their rival the JCP-sponsored Minsei, which vied for control of the resources provided by the student self-government organization at each academic unit and campus. Yet there were also many students who were not politically active in these groups. When a critical issue arose on a campus that affected all students, the Zenkyōtō model was initially a way to mobilize students to participate in a campus protest by means of open mass rallies using direct democracy, regardless of sect affiliation or its absence (Wheeler 1974) . Such rallies were used to select a steering committee, to make decisions about whether to begin or end a campus strike, and to carry out "mass bargaining" sessions with campus officials. The Zenkyōtō model diffused rapidly as issues arose at different campuses, but the campus Zenkyōtō was then often taken over by New Left sects with a strong presence on that campus. While mass participation was necessary to carry out an effective boycott of classes, smaller groups of activists were generally involved in occupying campus buildings, building barricades, maintaining these collective actions, and negotiating with faculty and administrators as the strike continued. The involvement of various pre-existing groups on campuses also ensured that differences of opinion would develop, which could degenerate into open conflict between groups.
Since an incident in the early 1950s in which police had infiltrated the University of Tokyo campus to investigate a radical drama group, there had been a clear mutual understanding that police were not to come onto the campus unless they were invited by the administration, and conversely, the administration would not invite police onto the campus, especially the riot police. During the Zenkyōtō era, police were regularly called to private university campuses to end building occupations quickly, but public institutions refused to call in the riot police and instead tried to manage strikes and building occupations through negotiations among the parties. As a result, at major national institutions where the prohibition on calling the riot police was strongest among both faculty and students, the conflicts dragged on for months, eventually leading to outside political pressure to bring closure.
What happened in the event
The University of Tokyo is Japan's number one academic institution, with very high prestige as a national university. It was formerly the original imperial university, and long the training ground for elite government bureaucrats. It is spread over two campuses, one at Komaba that houses the first two years of undergraduate education, and the main campus at Hongō, which has ten academic units covering literature, economics, law, medicine, pharmacy, engineering, education, agriculture, natural and physical sciences and offers both upper-level undergraduate and graduate degrees. 8 The central symbol of the University of Tokyo is Yasuda Auditorium with its distinctive clock tower, which was built in the 1920s with gifts from the Yasuda Company. It housed both a very large auditorium where entrance and graduation ceremonies were held, and offices of the central administration. It even contained a special reception room where in prewar Japan the Emperor waited before awarding commemorative watches to all University of Tokyo graduates (Kitano 1990 ).
The trouble began in the Medical School, where students were protesting the conditions of student interns, who were required to work without pay in the university hospital after completing their coursework. The autocratic medical school administration and faculty adamantly refused to listen to their concerns, so the students began an open-ended strike in late January 1968. A few weeks later there was a confrontation in which a group of students held the head of the hospital and his assistant hostage overnight in a meeting, after which the faculty of the school summarily expelled 17 students for their involvement. However, one of the students expelled had been misidentified and there was clear evidence that he was in Kyushu at the time of the protest. The expulsions and particularly the one clear mistake sparked renewed outrage among the medical students and led to an escalating series of events: boycott of graduation, obstruction of the new students' entrance ceremony, and then a broader strike of students in the whole medical school. In June 1968 when the medical school faculty officially refused to rescind the punishment of the innocent student, about forty medical students occupied Yasuda Auditorium. Two days later University President Okochi called in the riot police and 1,200 riot police removed the forty students still inside.
This in turn prompted an all-campus rally protesting the riot police entry onto campus, in which nine academic units went on a one-day strike. A few days later students in the faculty of literature, which had its own long-festering issue, went on an open-ended strike. The President called a meeting at Yasuda Auditorium and 6,000 students showed up hoping for a discussion, but the President refused, intending just to lecture them. The students angrily protested that they wanted a discussion, not a lecture. Suddenly the President, who had a heart condition, experienced some heart pain and left the room, ending the session. The students were already at Yasuda Auditorium and there they stayed for the next six months. The student committees of the various faculties and political sects established offices in different rooms where their members lived and worked, and the students used the building's public address system to broadcast their messages to the campus regularly from the clock tower. On July 2, the students solidified their occupation of Yasuda Auditorium by building barricades to prevent an attack, and on July 5 they established the Tōdai Zenkyōtō, issuing seven straightforward demands on July 15. 9 Over the next three months the students of each academic unit went on open-ended strike, as did the Komaba campus, producing an all-school strike. Students occupied campus buildings of their own units and constructed barricades with the furniture, so the campus resembled a war zone. By that time the New Left sects dominated Zenkyōtō, and were adamantly opposed by the 9 The demands involved not calling riot police to campus, rescinding punishments meted out to students in the medical school and faculty of literature, and not punishing anyone for participation in the current conflict, recognizing the medical students' association (seiiren), acknowledging that the students would not cooperate in any investigations into the conflicts, and a stipulation that all sides must agree to these conditions in a mass public meeting of the faculty, administration, and students. JCP group Minsei. Both groups began inviting their members from other schools to come to Tōdai to join them in the various occupied buildings or in opposing the strikes. At the beginning of November 1968, President Okochi and the entire faculty governing council resigned. Unable to elect a new president following normal procedures because of the strike, the university faculty selected Katō Ichirō, a younger law faculty member who had just returned from a sabbatical year at the University of California Berkeley and Harvard, to serve as the "President's representative." Although the atmosphere was tense and already somewhat dangerous, Katō began meeting with the main student groups (Zenkyōtō, Minsei, and the student representatives of each striking academic unit) to try to resolve the situation through discussion and negotiation. In December he presented a plan for resolving the conflict that addressed virtually all of the original Zenkyōtō demands except for the problems in the faculty of literature.
Outside political pressure added weight to reaching a resolution. After meeting with Ministry of Education officials, Katō announced that the University of Tokyo entrance exams for 1969 would be cancelled unless the conflict was resolved quickly. Both Minsei and non-sect students were ready to accept Kato's plan for resolution, but the sect-led Zenkyōtō group had hardened its position and there were occasional violent skirmishes between Zenkyōtō and Minsei students. By early January the students at seven academic units had voted to end their strikes, but the student bodies in literature and medicine continued their strikes and building occupations, and the Zenkyōtō students also continued to hold out in Yasuda auditorium. Groups of students allied with Zenkyōtō were also still occupying other campus buildings.
By that time it was well known that the students in the occupied buildings had been stockpiling stones, bottles, and gasoline, and there were rumors that they had brought in other dangerous weaponry as well. Moreover, many of the occupants of the buildings were not Tōdai students. Although the agreement with the seven academic units included a pledge that the university would not call in the riot police to resolve a campus conflict, just a week later Katō decided that the situation had become too dangerous and was no longer just an internal campus conflict. He called in the riot police. The police had been quietly preparing for this event for some time, but they demanded that the request to enter the campus be in writing, include a ground plan of each building to be cleared, and that a designated representative of the faculty be present at each place to be entered and searched (Asahi Shimbun 1969) .
Early in the morning of Saturday, 18 January 1969, 8,500 heavily equipped riot police and their big gray vehicles entered the Hongō campus. The two-day assault on occupied buildings on the Tōdai campus happened over a weekend, and all television stations combined broadcast 21 hours of live coverage of the assault (Kitano 1990 ). The first day the riot police cleared the engineering and law buildings with water cannon trucks and tear gas as students fought back with rocks and Molotov cocktails, but they could not penetrate Yasuda Auditorium (see Figure 2) . On Sunday morning, amid a hail of rocks, bricks, and Molotov cocktails, with police helicopters flying overhead dropping tear gas canisters to supplement the water cannon trucks, riot police began tearing down the barricades at Yasuda. Through the day they cleared the building floor by floor despite intense fighting.
Initially police just briefly chased students who ran from the occupied buildings, but all those who remained in the buildings until the end were arrested. There were also many serious injuries on both sides. In addition to the students from other universities who had entered the Tōdai campus earlier and were fighting in the occupied buildings, other students had come up to Tokyo from all over the country to fight additional riot police from behind street barricades in the nearby Kanda Jimbōchō bookstore area. Extra prosecutors had been brought to Tokyo from around the country to handle the expected load. The final count of students who were arrested and subsequently indicted in the fighting in and around the Tōdai campus that weekend was 630, including 374 at Yasuda Auditorium. Of those, only 70 were actually University of Tokyo students (Kitano 1990) .
Although this was clearly the symbolic climax, it was not the end of the conflict. On the Monday after the weekend assault, the Ministry of Education confirmed the official cancellation of University of Tokyo entrance exams for 1969. Riot police kept the campus on lockdown for another week while they searched the cleared buildings, after which construction companies were called in to clean up the mess and repair the damage. Classes gradually resumed over the following months, and some additional attempts to re-occupy buildings were quickly foiled by faculty and other students removing the barricades. 10 The campus remained very tense, with opposing groups of students either trying to go to classes under guard or being prevented from doing so by Zenkyōtō activists.
Analysis of the event at the time
The students understood their conflict as a response to the autocratic behavior of university officials when they tried to discuss legitimate grievances. Each time faculty and administrators arrogantly refused even to listen to them, the students' anger and frustration increased and their respect for authority decreased. Once the conflict had become campus-wide in the summer of 1968 and the students had re-occupied Yasuda Auditorium, they experienced a tremendous sense of liberation and empowerment. These were bright, hardworking students who had reached the pinnacle of the Japanese higher education system with its promise of lifelong elite status and careers. They had done so by obediently following the course laid out for them by parents and teachers, memorizing mountains of information without question in order to pass the entrance exams. Suddenly, in the heady atmosphere of the Zenkyōtō movement 10 While the initial building occupation at the Komaba campus was resolved without riot police intervention by cutting the electricity, water, and heat to the building, a later re-occupation of buildings at that campus did involve riot police intervention.
where decisions were being made collectively in huge open meetings, they were challenging each other to decide as individuals what they believed and what they were going to do, a process they called shutaisei or subjectivity, which today would be termed individual agency.
As student leaders articulated different positions and students were drawn into making choices that committed them to a course of action with immediate consequences, the situation hardened. With the campus on indefinite strike and buildings barricaded, students could either join in the increasingly violent factional conflicts, or withdraw and wait for it all to end. Meanwhile, the organized sects elaborated their positions ideologically. By January 1969, the Minsei students were calling the agreement of the seven academic units a "victory" because they had "won" most of the original Zenkyōtō demands. Conversely, the New Left sects that controlled Zenkyōtō now framed the conflict as a key battleground in their larger challenge to state authority, linked to all the other domestic and international issues of the day. They reinterpreted their continued commitment as a personal renunciation of their elite status as Tōdai students who had been destined to join that very state authority.
Meanwhile, the general public was getting a radically different picture through the mass media. In fact there were many university campuses on strike during the fall of 1968 and winter of 1969. The mass media reported the conflicts and immediate developments, but generally obtained their information from university authorities and the police, and did not explain what had led the students to strike. In the month of January, 1969, newspapers were giving heavy coverage to strikes at half a dozen major universities, including Nihon University (where the Zenkyōtō movement originated), Tokyo Education University, Kyoto University, Yokohama National University, Ritsumeikan University, and Meiji Gakuin University. The University of Tokyo conflict was simply part of the blurry image of student revolt all across the country, which rose to the forefront only during the two-day assault by the riot police.
The front-page story in the Asahi Shimbun on the morning of January 18 reporting the entry of the riot police, explained it as follows:
The security authorities, government, and Liberal Democratic Party have decided that the Tōdai conflict is no longer just a Tōdai conflict but has become a struggle against state authority at Tōdai that is intended to destroy "Tokyo Imperialistic University." For that reason, the bureaucracy, the political world, and the financial world feel a sense of impending crisis to the social structure, which along with the rising public opinion hoping for normalization of Tōdai has encouraged the police. (Asahi Shimbun 1969) This picks up the most militant rhetoric of Zenkyōtō at the end of the conflict, refracted into a threat to the prevailing social order as perceived by the "iron triangle" of Japan's elites, with a nod to public opinion, to justify why the riot police entered the campus. Many of those elites experienced the occupation of Yasuda Auditorium as a very personal violation of their own identification with their alma mater and all it stood for. The nod to public opinion was also significant. Through much of 1968 there was broad general support for the street protests on national and international issues in which students participated, but as the New Left student protests became more violent, that support began to weaken. In December 1968 the Cabinet office commissioned two public opinion surveys that showed the public would now tolerate stronger action against student violence. Those findings became the justification not only for the forceful intervention in the Tōdai conflict, but also for a new, unannounced policy of holding arrested students indefinitely and charging them with more serious offenses, which was applied to the students arrested the weekend of 18/19 January 1969 (Steinhoff 1999a ).
Chun reports that over 70 % of households watched the Sunday conclusion of the occupation at Yasuda Auditorium on television, but as noted above, opinion polls indicate that sympathy for the students was tempered by opposition to their violence. He also observes that the television coverage depicted the violence but lacked analysis of the reasons behind the protests. Increasingly, television coverage only focused on violence and thereby seriously distorted the nature of protests, most of which were nonviolent (Chun 2007) . Students themselves were acutely aware of this distortion in both television and newspaper coverage. In fact, students from other universities were also watching the television coverage that weekend, often feeling deep personal connection to the students battling the riot police at Yasuda Auditorium. While some students personally knew someone who had gone up to support the students at Tōdai, many more saw in the violent confrontation the inevitability of defeat and the futility of trying to face down the massive power of the state.
After the dramatic weekend ending the occupation of Yasuda Auditorium, the dominant theme of newspaper coverage focused on the cancellation of 1969 entrance exams at Tōdai, the issue with the widest resonance in the general public. The University of Tokyo, as symbolized by Yasuda Auditorium, represented the highest aspiration of students and their parents, with many thousands of students competing for the small number of places available. In cancelling the entrance exams, the Ministry of Education's plan had been to increase the number of students accepted at a number of other national universities so that the overall number of university places for entering freshmen would not decrease. However, over the following days other universities announced that they would not cooperate with the Ministry's plan. The usual reason announced in the newspapers was that they could not accommodate the extra students, but there also was an undercurrent of resistance to the Ministry's interference with what were presumed to be academic decisions made by each institution. At Kyoto University, which was in the midst of a more limited student strike, students and faculty worked together to clear the barricades and remove students from an occupied campus building so their entrance exams would not be jeopardized.
Within the New Left, the arrest of several hundred students in the Tōdai conflict mobilized supporters who had already begun to develop a legal support system for arrested students, encouraging them to resist pressure to confess and instead to fight the cases in court. The system, coordinated by a small office called Relief Contact Center (Kyūen renraku sentā), still exists today. A high proportion of the Tōdai arrestees used the Kyūen system, and the progress of their trials was reported regularly in Kyūen's newspaper, which was widely available by subscription and in bookstores catering to students. As part of their trial preparation, the Tōdai defendants also wrote lengthy theoretical accounts about the ideas and aims of their movement, which were published at the time. The trials themselves were raucous affairs with activist supporters and the defendants themselves disrupting the courtroom, while loud demonstrations took place outside. Thus, within the New Left quite broadly, the trials of the Tōdai defendants who used the Kyūen system became part of how the conflict was reshaped and remembered.
The Zenkyōtō movement continued to diffuse to other universities in the first half of 1969, and in September 1969 a national Zenkyōtō was formed, led primarily by the New Left sects, but the movement was already on its way out. In July 1969 the Diet passed a University Control Law that allowed the Ministry of Education to take over control of any university that was unable to bring an end to its student conflict within six months. By the spring of 1970 the wave of campus conflicts was over and the Zenkyōtō movement also faded away (Steinhoff 1999b) . Many universities subsequently abolished their student self-government organizations to avoid future trouble from organized student protests.
Subsequent memories and impact
Investigating the conflict as a Tōdai student newspaper reporter twenty years later, Kitano Ryūichi discovered that Yasuda Auditorium remained a taboo subject on campus. Neither entrance ceremonies nor graduation ceremonies had been held there since the conflict, and the interior of the building was largely off-limits, with some parts being used for administrative offices and the main hall for storage. Yet even today, Yasuda Auditorium remains the dominant vis-ual symbol of the University of Tokyo and still figures prominently in the university's own publicity and in cram school advertisements. Students walk past it daily, most not even knowing what happened there in 1968-69. At the same time, the iconic photograph of the occupied building with students waving sect flags continues to appear in retrospectives of the late 1960s protests and arouses strong memories among former New Left activists. The memories are often painful.
During the 1970s and 1980s, several novels were published which took the student conflicts either as their main theme or as the backdrop for the story. Collectively, these novels have come to be known as "Zenkyōtō Bungaku." 11 Although they are fictionalized treatments that often change or disguise the location of the conflict, they clearly are based on the authors' personal familiarity with campus conflicts during the Zenkyōtō era and later reflections on what it meant. They depict characters with varying degrees of involvement in the conflicts and varying perspectives, so they definitely do not present a unified view. However a few commonalities stand out. First, they regard the campus conflicts as having failed at great personal cost to some of the participants through derailed careers, serious physical injuries, and deaths either at the hands of the riot police or by suicide. Second, they provide vivid pictures of the complexity and confusion of life during a campus strike, with competing demonstrations going on outside barricaded buildings, hostility and violence between students allied with different groups, and ordinary students trying to make sense of it all. Third, they convey the emotional intensity and visceral, physical sensation that some participants experienced through engaging in violence, rather than the ideological arguments that dominated sect discourse (Taki 1979) . These novels can be regarded both as how some participants reflected later on the conflicts, and also as part of what was put out into the public discourse for non-participants to read. They provide insight into what the experience of participation was like, but they also convey a deep sense of failure and sadness about it.
Several of the stories depict some character other than the protagonist as having participated directly from inside Yasuda Auditorium and thus reflect the point of view of other students who watched the action from the outside. They still shared a very general sense of disappointment as the key battle in which their hopes had been invested came crashing down in failure (Hoshino 11 My thanks to Kojima Shinji for going through the Zenkyōtō Bungaku materials in the University of Hawaii's Takazawa Collection to find segments related to either the First Haneda Incident or the University of Tokyo conflict, photocopying relevant pages, and also providing summaries of the general plot of the stories. 1978). Taki Shūzō's story includes a conflict between one student leader who eagerly wants to join the battle in the clock tower and another who views it cynically as a way for students who are not sufficiently committed to end the struggle in defeat. The story ends with the eager activist leaving the clock tower to find the cynic and kill him, only to find that he has already committed suicide (Taki 1979) A novel by Hahakigi Hōsei probes the meaning of the event for those who experienced it and the next generation, centering on some film that was supposedly shot inside Yasuda Auditorium during the final assault. A television producer who participated in the conflict outside of Yasuda Auditorium (and left in time to preserve his own future) wants to make a retrospective of the conflict. He remembers his youthful violent confrontation with the state romantically, as a life-changing experience. He muses that all the available film footage is taken from the external point of view of the police, except for some raw footage that was shot from inside the building during the final assault and would show what it was really like. He sends a subordinate to find the person who supposedly has the film.
The person who has the film has sacrificed his life to the task of protecting it, and has kept the film secret for twelve years. He is hiding from members of a rival faction who want to obtain it. Just before they find and kill him, he sends the film to the young man from the TV studio so that its message will be passed on to a new generation. The message he wants to pass on is bleak. He likens the students' final stand at Yasuda Auditorium to a poisonous scorpion's method of suicide, saying that if you put oil all around a scorpion and set it on fire, the scorpion will arch its poisonous tail over its back until it stings itself to death with its own venom (Hahakigi 1981) . Instead of turning the film over to his superior, the young man locks himself into a broadcasting studio and broadcasts it live in its entirety, destroying his own future with this act of defiance.
Aside from these novels, there has also been a continuing flow of nonfiction retrospectives of Zenkyōtō, written as autobiographies by participants or as edited volumes of recollections and analyses of the movement. These accounts tend to be published by small presses and carried primarily in the counterculture bookstores maintained by and for the survivors of the New Left generation. Such books do not have the same heavily negative tone of the novels, and instead tend to commemorate the period nostalgically. By resurrecting and reinforcing the original political goals of the movement and the ideals of the young people who participated in it, they keep alive the counter-memory of an idealistic movement that failed because of the overwhelming power of the state.
The University of Tokyo conflict is frequently included in media retrospectives and anniversary commemorations about the protests of the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly retrospectives of the New Left. Within that genre, the photograph of an occupied Yasuda Auditorium frequently appears as a key icon. Generally, however, there is little elaboration -certainly no explanation of what precipitated the conflict and why the students were occupying the auditorium. Instead, this image of Yasuda Auditorium is part of a stream of images of helmeted students clashing violently with riot police in various settings, on campuses and in the streets. The overall impression is that the New Left produced a period of excess, of mindless, violent conflict that took a terrible toll and accomplished nothing. That image also colors whatever is said about the broader period of street protests against the Vietnam War and against the Security Treaty in 1970. Marotti (2009) notes that there was a short window in 1968 in which mass media and the general public expressed sympathy for the students, but that window closed amid the continuing violence. However, we cannot see the full impact of these retrospectives until we look at the third of our key events.
Rengō Sekigun and Asama Sansō

What happened in the event
Following the University of Tokyo conflict, violence in both campus conflicts and street protests continued for another year, along with escalating arrests and prosecutions of New Left activists. These twin processes divided the movement and led many more students to withdraw from activism. However, the same pressures further radicalized a small segment of the movement and attracted some younger participants who were excited by the violence and less interested in the political rationale for the movement. As police pressure on them increased, these small groups were pushed underground, where they were harder to find and could engage in even more dangerous acts. My colleagues and I have argued that the emergence of these underground groups must be understood as part of the dynamics of the decline phase of the New Left protest cycles in Europe, the United States, and Japan. They were never completely cut off from the larger movement, but the exigencies of underground life distorted their ideological aims and led them into ordinary criminal activities Zwerman 2012, 2013; Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005; Zwerman et al. 2000) .
Two such groups that went underground but had quite different orientations ended up merging in a disastrous marriage of convenience to form the United Red Army (Rengō Sekigun). Some members of both groups were already wanted by the police for robberies carried out during their desperate underground life. One group, the Red Army (Sekigunha), had robbed banks and payrolls and had a lot of money, while the other group, Revolutionary Left Faction (Kakumei Saha), had robbed a gun shop and had weapons but was desperate for money. They retreated into the mountains in the fall of 1971 to try to create a new group by combining their ideologies and their quite different memberships. By November 1971 nine of the persons on Japan's top ten wanted list were members of these two groups, and seven of them were together in the mountains with the United Red Army. The police were looking for them, but they did not know the two groups had merged.
The combined events known as the Rengō Sekigun purge and the Asama Sansō siege were experienced by the outside world in reverse order in February, 1972 . In mid-February the police found some of their abandoned cabins in the mountains, and then caught up with the leaders of the original two groups (Mori Tsuneo and Nagata Hiroko) in a Gunma prefecture cave that other members of the group had just left. With police helicopters buzzing overhead searching for them during daylight, nine remaining members trekked for two nights through the snow on a high mountain trail toward the mountain resort town of Karuizawa in neighboring Nagano prefecture, carrying with them their stolen guns and ammunition. Police arrested four members of the group at the Karuizawa train station on the morning of February 19 and then chased the remaining five to a corporate mountain lodge called Asama Sansō, where they took the caretaker's wife hostage and prepared for a standoff.
Built on a steep mountainside with access to the top floor from a winding mountain road and the rest of the building spilling four more stories down the mountainside, the nearly impregnable lodge was also well stocked with food. The police brought in massive reinforcements, but to avoid harm to the hostage they laid siege to the building for nine days, during which two policemen and a bystander were killed by shots fired from inside the building. The news media were kept far away for safety reasons, but covered the siege from the next mountain over using high-powered telephoto lenses on their cameras to supplement the press announcements made by the police. Adding drama to the siege, the police brought up the mothers of several members to beg them tearfully to leave. On the tenth day the police brought in a wrecking ball and demolished the front of the building. The final day of the siege was watched live by over 90 % of the television viewing audience in a marathon live broadcast lasting 10 hours and 40 minutes. Very little was happening once the wrecking ball had Patricia G. Steinhoff opened up the building and the police moved inside, so announcers focused attention on the fate of the hostage, until she and all five young men were brought out unharmed (see Figure 3) .
During the subsequent interrogations, police discovered that there had been a deadly internal purge within the group, in which fourteen members had lost their lives. The details were so horrendous that initially the police did not believe the stories they were hearing, but as they began to dig up bodies around the group's campsites in the mountains, the nightmare was revealed. News cameras and reporters followed as police dug up bodies at remote sites in several prefectures. The whole society recoiled as more and more revelations about the Rengō Sekigun purge came to light in March and April. The secrets of the purge had remained closely held until well after the Asama Sansō siege had ended. The time reversal was complete, and even people who were very close to the participants learned about the Rengō Sekigun purge through the mass media along with the rest of Japanese society in the spring of 1972, after they had first experienced the massive media coverage of the Asama Sansō siege.
Analysis of the event at the time
Despite the odd location for a political confrontation, New Left students initially regarded the Asama Sansō siege as a revival of their movement through a momentous battle with the riot police, and held cheering support rallies on college campuses. Meanwhile, the newspapers, television programs, and general public were focused on the fate of the woman hostage and the casualties of the Asama Sansō siege. When the siege ended there was great relief on both sides that no one inside had been injured or killed. The New Left community regarded the five men who had carried out the siege as heroes, while the public and mass media saw them simply as criminals who had finally been caught.
The New Left's trial support system through Kyūen Renraku Center provided legal assistance to the two leaders who had been arrested in Gunma prefecture, those who were arrested at the Karuizawa train station, and the five who had been holding out with the hostage during the siege. Initially, many New Left supporters from both groups and from a wider circle of sympathizers were ready to provide trial support for those arrested, especially for the "heroes" of the Asama Sansō siege. As news of the purge leaked out and then was confirmed with bodies and names, the trial support groups broke apart. The trial itself was also split, with the leaders and a small group around them choosing to fight the long court battle against charges that included the death penalty for the leaders. The others blamed the leadership for leading them astray and participated in a separate trial that concluded quickly with short sentences for most of the defendants.
The news of the purge was paralyzing, tragic, and divisive for the movement. The New Left was thoroughly accustomed to infighting both within and between sects, and a few people had been killed in such conflicts over the years, but this was a totally different scale. The tiny United Red Army had started with only 29 people who came to the mountains, but fourteen of them had died in the purge at the hands of the others. Present and former members of both the Red Army and Revolutionary Left Faction all knew people who had died in the purge, and they also knew people who were responsible for their deaths. It was a personal tragedy as well as a challenge to everything they had believed in. The debate also engulfed those already behind bars, whose friends and subordinates were implicated on both sides. They tried to make sense of Rengō Sekigun by looking for the point in the long line of ideological positions and justifications where things had taken a wrong turn. The imprisoned former leaders of the two organizations felt they, too, were somehow responsible for acts they could neither prevent nor undo.
The debate and the sense of personal involvement spread much more widely in the New Left than just the two organizations directly involved, because they in turn had sprung from other groups. At the time there were at least two or three other small factions that had begun to go underground and pursue more radical tactics in order to keep going in the face of heavy repression of the movement. They were in danger of plunging into the same morass, and now they knew it. Even though people in their parent groups may well have fought hard against the more radical faction and opposed it, they also knew how close they had come. While some people continued trying to find some answers within the brambles of New Left ideology, most just gave up trying.
The public response to the combination of the Asama Sansō and the Rengō Sekigun purge was less conflicted because it was negative from the beginning. As Chun points out, most Japanese had watched the end of the Asama Sansō siege unfold slowly in real time in a spectacle that was focused almost entirely on whether the hostage was safe (Chun 2007) . The perpetrators of the hostage taking were regarded negatively, and since it was clearly understood that they had acted from political motives, that negativity attached to their organizations and also more broadly tarred the New Left. Once the news of the purge came out, the reaction was overwhelmingly negative. The mass media now had faces to attach to the purge, notably the two leaders who had been captured just before Asama Sansō, Mori Tsuneo and Nagata Hiroko. Even before Mori's suicide at the end of December 1972, Nagata had been constructed in the media as a female monster whose deranged ideas and behavior were primarily responsible for the deaths in the purge. After his death, she became the primary object of public hatred. The news media also tried to understand why the purge had happened, and experts proposed all sorts of theories about why the group had turned on its own members, proposing theories about their poor diet along with psychological analyses of the leaders.
Subsequent memories and impact
The Rengō Sekigun incident has produced a flood of books and media representations that continues forty years later, triggered by anniversary events, trial activity that lasted for twenty years, and the intellectual curiosity of later generations. The impact and memory of the event is overwhelmingly negative, but there are still distinct differences in its wider social impact and the lessons drawn from it, between those who were close to or participated in the New Left and the broader public that stood outside it. Moreover, subsequent memories of Rengō Sekigun are inextricably tied to memories of the earlier events and have become deeply embedded in broader narratives of the period.
On the movement side, most of the main figures have written books about their experience, which were published with the assistance of their support groups and lawyers. They provided detailed accounts of what happened in the mountains and a clearer picture of how participants experienced these events. These books and the ongoing trial brought new people into trial support for the main defendants, including some death penalty opponents and some feminists responding to a combination of Nagata's personal story and the hostile media treatment of her. This led in turn to deep engagement of the Japanese women's liberation movement with Rengō Sekigun, Nagata's role in it, and her characterization by the media (Shigematsu 2012a (Shigematsu , 2012b . My own sociological analysis of the unstoppable dynamics of the purge, based on the participants' writings and interviews, became a part of this public discussion after it was published in Japanese (Steinhoff 1991 (Steinhoff , 2003 . While no one actually condoned or defended the deadly purge, those close to the movement found broader reasons to support the defendants. They also knew that a brain tumor diagnosed in the 1980s was responsible for some of Nagata's dramatic behavior during trial sessions. They view the Rengō Sekigun purge as the tragic climax of a failed protest movement, but they continue to remember earlier periods in the movement with considerable nostalgia.
In recent years some of the surviving participants in the Rengō Sekigun purge who are out of prison have joined with others in a new effort to try to understand what happened. They have collected new accounts by those close to the event and published them in a newsletter and in other formats, and have arranged small group commemorative visits to the remote sites associated with the purge. With the fortieth anniversary of the event and Nagata Hiroko's death in 2012, the group was discovered by the mainstream media. They now speak to a wider audience and are republishing the materials they have collected. One of the participants in the main leaders' trial, Uegaki Yasuhiro, has collaborated in the production of a manga series based loosely on the events. In addition, Uegaki and some others close to the events have also published new books in recent years in which they have reflected on the events and examined them from new perspectives. At the same time, a few of the survivors who participated in the separate trial and some of their supporters have also published books that continued to place the blame for the tragedy on Nagata Hiroko.
For the broader public, the Rengō Sekigun incident and its continuing representation in the media stands as the inevitable disaster that ended the violent protest cycle of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It allowed the society to shut the door on that contentious period as an aberration, and focus instead on the future and the fruits of Japan's period of high economic growth. Student protest was deliberately and forcefully pushed underground and out of sight. After the rubble of campus protests had been cleared away and order was restored, many universities systematically reduced the opportunities for student mobilization by banning student self-government organizations and limiting student political activity. The very subject of student protest became taboo for faculty, administrators, and students at many campuses, including institutions that had been centrally involved in Zenkyōtō protests. The same faculty, graduate students, and administrators were still there, but the experience of direct conflict had been so painful that no one wanted to talk about it in public, let alone study it.
During the rest of the 1970s there were occasional shocking incidents from other remnants of the Japanese movement that had moved underground or into exile in the same way that Rengō Sekigun had. These incidents were subsequently added to the long line of events that appeared as flashes of immediately recognizable images of violence in media commemorations, reinforcing the impression of repeated incomprehensible, meaningless violence. Then in the early 1980s, these same events were retroactively reconstructed as part of the international War on Terror promoted by US President Ronald Reagan, to which the Japanese government eagerly signed on Zwerman 2012, 2013) . The terrorism label heightened the image of the entire protest cycle as dangerous and repellent. Although there were still occasional small protest demonstrations on public streets in Japan, they were often relegated to routes out of public view, surrounded with a heavy police presence that further communicated the message that the public had to be protected from contamination by such dangerous activity (Steinhoff 2006) .
Consequently, except for those from families with a strong tradition of opposition politics, students who entered college over the next two decades were largely apolitical. They viewed even mild forms of political activism as frightening and personally threatening. When completely new generations of young people in the 1990s and early 2000s began to express concern about international issues that threatened to involve Japan such as wars in the Persian Gulf, the negativity attached to "militant" political protest and street demonstrations was still palpable. Symbols of militant student protest of the 1960s such as helmets with organization names on them evoked fear in young people who knew them only from television clips. To counter this aversion to the political protests of young people in the 1960s, their youthful successors three decades later invented new forms of political demonstrations with lively music and dancing, aiming to attract youth to join in something that seemed more like a fun parade, even if it carried a political message. Hence, although there have been occasional short periods of increased political activism in Japan over the past two decades, it is really only since 3/11 that participation in political activism on the streets of Japan has been normalized on a large scale.
The latest film about the Rengō Sekigun incident, Jitsuroku Rengō Sekigun: Asama Sansō e no Michi, is a documentary-style drama produced by the late Wakamatsu Kōji in 2007 and released in English as United Red Army, which won the Best Asian Film award at the Berlin International Film Festival in 2010. The film was eagerly awaited by those close to the movement in the hopes that it would present a more balanced picture of what had happened. Although it did present more of the personal relationships connecting people from the Red Army side of what became Rengō Sekigun, those closest to the participants from both groups complained that his dramatization had seriously mischaracterized the key figures of Mori Tsuneo and Nagata Hiroko. Feminists were particularly disappointed with his depiction of Nagata Hiroko, which some woman filmmakers hope to rectify in the future. With its documentary-style elements, Wakamatsu's film also connects the Rengō Sekigun incident both backwards and forwards to events characterized as international terrorism, opening with the image of a 1970 hijacking to North Korea by the Red Army Faction and closing with a rolling list of people who had been involved in international incidents carried out by the Japanese Red Army based in the Middle East during the 1970s and their whereabouts at the time of the film's release. As the media depiction that will probably have the widest viewership and produce the strongest twenty-first century impression of the Rengō Sekigun incident for some time, the film solidifies the retrospective embedding of the event into a narrative of international terrorism with which it had only indirect personal links at the time it happened. 12 6 Collective memory and the inversion of time There are clearly prospective, sequential connections among the three events analyzed here within the larger context of the New Left protest cycle of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The First Haneda Incident in 1967 launched a period of steady escalation of violence in clashes between New Left students and the police, and thus affected the tactics employed by both sides in subsequent street protests. These violent confrontations became institutionalized even as 12 During the leaders' trial the Japanese Red Army staged an international hostage event to secure the release of several persons in Japanese prisons. Some of the Rengō Sekigun defendants were offered release and one, Bandō Kunio, did take the offer and go to the Middle East. they continued to escalate incrementally. Some groups became engrossed in the immediate activity of escalating violence, while other groups backed away from the violence and ceased to participate in public events that were likely to become violent. At the same time, much of the public support for the New Left disappeared. Its role as part of a broad national alliance of groups protesting together about serious domestic and international issues declined, while its proclivity for violence tainted the other groups and the protest issues they advocated together. In the process, the purpose and meaning of the protests became obscured in the focus on New Left violence.
A similar thing happened with the campus issues that gave rise to the Zenkyōtō movement and were epitomized in the conflict at Tokyo University in January, 1969. As the movement was taken over by the New Left sects, it became more violent and produced internal conflict among student groups with differing views. The public view of the protests promulgated by the media focused on the violence without presenting the issues of university governance and treatment of students that had prompted the protests in the first place, further reinforcing the image of mindless violence disrupting the social order of Japan. Although the Zenkyōtō movement continued to spread to other campuses for another year, the battle between police and students at Tokyo University marked the onset of a massive police crackdown on student protest.
The police crackdown on protest involved both street demonstrations and campus Zenkyōtō conflicts, which were treated in the media as similar forms of senseless violence. Although the issues and sites were fundamentally different, they were materially linked in the sense that campuses, particularly student-occupied ones on strike, were used as staging areas for street protests about domestic and international events. The massive police and criminal justice crackdown on protest succeeded in repressing public New Left activity and eventually ended the public phase of the protest cycle, but it drove a segment of the movement underground and into exile. That in turn produced an increase in criminal acts committed by underground groups to enable their survival, including the two groups that later merged into Rengō Sekigun. Hence it led to the circumstances that culminated in the Asama Sansō siege and the Rengō Sekigun purge.
While these sequential connections among the actual events are important, what is more significant analytically is the way the events were experienced and remembered out of sequence, so that subsequent events deeply colored the collective memory of earlier ones and produced new retrospective linkages among the events after the fact. It is commonly recognized that collective memories of past events are reshaped to fit narratives created as a result of later events in the context of broader social and political changes. There is evidence of this with both sets of contending collective memories, among participants in the New Left and the general public, but it shapes them in different ways.
The inversion of time began with the actual public experience of the Asama Sansō siege preceding awareness of the Rengō Sekigun purge for everyone except the immediate survivors of the purge. Everyone else experienced the two events in reversed time order, so that the initial response to the siege had to be reevaluated in light of the gradual emergence of evidence of the purge. For the general public this simply reinforced an initial negative response to what they understood as a hostage crisis, while for those in the New Left it was a more wrenching psychological reversal from support for the small group holding off a huge riot police force for ten days, to disorientation and dismay as the evidence of the purge came to light a few weeks later.
Beyond this, analysis of three events marking the beginning, middle, and end of the New Left protest cycle has revealed that time inversion is a more fundamental feature of the contentious collective memories of these events. The two divergent lines of collective memory are partially shaped by common exposure to massive public media coverage of the events at the time, followed by recurring waves of commemorative anniversary retrospectives and new public materials in both print and visual media over the ensuing decades. Those close to the movement have also been exposed to a second stream of counterculture publications and other media that they produce and circulate, along with many forms of personal interaction, as they participate in the invisible civil society that has grown out of the remains of the New Left since the 1970s.
What do these two retrospective inversions look like? For veterans of the New Left protest cycle, the disaster of Rengō Sekigun colors memory of what came before and has forced deep reflection about how the movement got to that point and where it went wrong. The Asama Sansō siege appears in retrospect as an incredibly misplaced battle fought by people who knew the depths of interpersonal violence to which they had already fallen. It is read very personally as a colossal failure and betrayal of what the movement was originally about, even for those who retained some sympathy and attachment to the people who had been directly involved. As they move backward searching for the roots of that disaster, for some it has led back to a reconsideration of the Zenkyōtō movement and the Tokyo University conflict as its iconic struggle. Even as they appreciate and re-experience the emotional satisfactions of their own participation, they also see its ending as a defeat and a failure. This retrospective sense of failure comes through strongly in Zenkyōtō Bungaku, which was written by people who were close to but not centrally involved in the conflict, and who worked out their feelings through the creative avenue of literature.
It is much less apparent in the more politically involved participants, whose sense of camaraderie and fighting together for a cause was reinforced by their participation in collective trials with strong support groups. But they, too, were tempered by time in prison and returned to a society in which the movement they knew had been severely repressed. Many of them retain ties to old movement networks through their participation in the much milder social movement activities of the invisible civil society, including trial support groups and small groups that advocate for a variety of causes. Their memories tend to focus nostalgically on earlier events such as the First Haneda Incident, in which the New Left's promise of resistance against political wrongs remains strong. That nostalgia is reinforced by continued immersion in retrospectives of the movement, as well as by social interaction with other veterans of the New Left who have disavowed the violence but continue to embody the movement's early ideals of social justice.
Their collective memory of the period remains distinctively and contentiously different from the prevailing collective memory of the general public, as expressed through mainstream media retrospectives. It is not simply that these media retrospectives present strings of familiar images of violence without any explanation of what the protests were about. They also reflect a retrospective reinterpretation of the entire period as embodying what it had become by the time of the Rengō Sekigun incident. The criminality of the hostage taking at Asama Sansō and the appalling violence of the purge reflect backward to intensify the impact of the Tokyo University conflict as the senseless destruction of both social order and the personal aspirations of a generation of young people. While there is little public memory of the First Haneda Incident, these retrospective commemorations of images of violence do stretch back to other incidents of violent protest in 1968. We have already shown the impact of this collective memory of senseless violence on subsequent generations of young Japanese.
However, over time these public retrospectives also have incorporated later incidents of violence perpetrated by underground groups in Japan as well as the international attacks carried out by the young Japanese in exile who began as volunteers for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and later became the Japanese Red Army in the Middle East. In this subsequent media reconstruction of collective memory, the Rengō Sekigun incident becomes not the end of the New Left protest cycle of the late 1960s and early 1970s, but an episode of violence sandwiched in the middle of a much longer narrative of violence without meaning perpetrated by dangerous young people. Beginning in the 1980s all of those events came to be reframed retroactively as part of the Japanese version of the international War on Terror. Anniversary documenta-ries produced for television show sequences of images of violence extending from the 1960s to the 1980s or even later, with Rengō Sekigun in the middle of the sequence. Similarly, print retrospectives tend to provide quick chronologies that list a long series of events that begins in the 1960s and extends into the 1980s and beyond. That public image has persisted through the production of Wakamatsu's film in 2007, which perpetuates the retrospective collective memory trope of terrorism connecting this long line of violent events, even as it explores Rengō Sekigun in greater depth.
From the broader perspective of collective memory research, these events clearly represent contending memories and they also are now viewed by both sides as largely negative. In Fine's (2001) characterization of three types of "difficult reputations" this negative view has solidified for the general society. A subculture of the New Left maintains a contending view, but to date they have had little success in promoting that view more broadly. Recent feminist works have begun to reinterpret the figure of Nagata Hiroko (Shigematsu 2012b) and as more historians examine the materials from this period from a distance, there may be further reinterpretations that would address the second key question of collective memory research, which is how such collective memories are constructed and maintained.
As for the issue of the function of such negative collective memories for the society, the answer seems clear. The violent conflict on the streets and college campuses in late 1960s to early 1970s Japan was a reflection of deep internal divisions in Japanese society that were addressed by the state through strong actions to restore public order while paying as little attention as possible to the social and political issues that were being raised. The retrospective negative collective memory of the whole period of student conflict has served to reinforce the outcome in favor of social order and helped to weaken the potential for social conflict over the still unresolved issues for several decades. The mechanism for doing so has been to reduce complex contentious political events to a stream of visual images of violence with no explanation of what motivated them. Images of unrelated events are strung together to extend the chronology and portray the entire period as senseless violence perpetrated by dangerous young terrorists.
Since the 3/11 natural and human disasters, there has been a resurgence of social movement participation in Japan, by both older groups from the invisible civil society reactivated by the resurgent anti-nuclear movement, and younger people new to political protest who are inventing new forms of participation to express their concerns. In the face of the overwhelming violence of nature, these social movements have been peaceful. Public and media reaction to them has been largely positive, even though many of the older participants have roots in the protest movements of the 1960s. This raises the question of whether post-3/11 social movement activity will lead to any revised collective memory of these earlier protest events among the general public and mass media, or if they will remain as contentious collective memories of the past which connect to the present in quite different ways, but are resolutely separated from current protest activity.
